Abstract. In this paper attacks on double block length hash functions using a block cipher are considered. We present attacks on all double block length hash functions of hash rate 1, that is, hash functions where in each round the block cipher is used twice, s.t. one encryption is needed per message block. In particular, our attacks break the Parallel-DM presented at Crypto'93 3].
Introduction
A hash function is an easily implementable mapping from the set of all binary sequences to the set of binary sequences of some xed length. An iterated hash function is a hash function Hash( ) determined by an easily computable function h( ; ) from two binary sequences of respective lengths m and l to a binary sequence of length m in the manner that the message M = (M1; M2; :::;Mn), where Mi is of length l, is hashed to the hash value H = Hn of length m by computing recursively Hi = h(Hi?1; Mi) i = 1; 2; :::;n; (1) where H0 is a speci ed initial value. The function h will be called the hash round function. We will consider iterated hash functions based on (m; k) block ciphers, where an (m; k) block cipher de nes, for each k-bit key, a reversible mapping from the set of all m-bit plaintexts onto the set of all m-bit ciphertexts. We write EZ(X) to denote the encryption of the m-bit plaintext X under the k-bit key Z, and DZ(Y ) to denote the decryption of the m-bit ciphertext Y under the k-bit key Z. We de ne the hash rate of such an iterated hash function (or equivalently, of a round function) as the number of m-bit message blocks processed per encryption or decryption. The complexity of an attack is the total number of encryptions or decryptions required for the attack. In our discussion we will always assume that the block length of the block cipher equals the key length and that the (m; m) block cipher has no known weaknesses.
To avoid some trivial attacks 7], the Merkle-Damgaard Strengthening (MD-strengthening) is often used, in which the last block of the message to be hashed represents the binary length of the true message. However, in the attacks presented in this paper the messages are of the same length, therefore we will not consider MD-strengthening anymore in this paper. Theorem 1 (HLMW-93 3]) For the 2m-bit iterated hash function with hash rate 1=2 or 1 whose 2m-bit round function is of type (2) , the complexity of a free-start target attack is upper-bounded by about 2 2 m and the complexity of a free-start collision attack is upper-bounded by about 2 2 m=2 .
Hash functions obtaining these upper bounds as lower bounds for the free-start attacks are said to be optimum against a free-start attack 3]. The idea is, that given a speci c initial value of the hash function the designer hopes that the complexity of collision and target attacks are higher than the proven lower bounds. In 3], the Parallel-DM, a new double block length hash function of rate 1 with optimum security against free-start attacks was proposed. We give two attacks on Parallel-DM, a target attack and a collision attack with about the same complexities as of the free-start target and free-start collision attacks. This means that the Parallel-DM is no more secure than the Davies-Meyer hash mode (DM), which was the purpose in the rst place. Our attacks can be generalized and the following result holds Proof 3 Attacks on all double block length hash functions of hash rate 1
In 11] it was shown that there exist basically two secure single block length hash functions. The Davies-Meyer scheme, Hi = EM i (Hi?1) Hi?1 (6) is one of them, the other one is the following Hi = EM i (Hi?1) Hi?1 Mi (7) All other secure single block length hash functions can be transformed into either (6) or (7) by a linear transformations of the inputs Mi and Hi? 1 11] . It means that for a double block length hash function one can obtain optimum security against free-start attacks if the scheme is equivalent to either two runs of (6) or two runs of (7) Theorem 5 For the 2m-bit iterated hash function with rate 1, where (at least) one of the hash round functions has the form of a single block length hash function, i.e. the matrix L of (8) has a rank of less than or equal to two, the complexity of a target attack is upper-bounded by about 3 2 m , and the complexity of a collision attack is upper-bounded by about 3 2 m=2 . The attacks succeed with probability about 0.63.
Proof: We will show that the T of Theorem 2 is about zero. We assume w.l.g. that the hash round functions of type (8) Proof: We will show that the T of Theorem 4 is at most 1. We assume w.l.g. that the hash round functions of type (8) can be expressed as in (9) . We split the proof into two cases.
Rank(N2) = 1. Let MZ be the set fM 4 
Conclusion
We have shown attacks on double block length hash functions of hash rate 1. Our attacks show that a double block hash function of hash rate 1, which has optimum security against free-start attacks, is also vulnerable to real attacks with only slighty higher complexities. Furthermore we have shown that for all double block length hash functions of hash rate 1 based on a secret key block cipher, there exist target attacks with complexity of about 4 2 m . In some cases the attack needs a pre-computed table of size 2 m .
